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Abstract 
We examine the qualitative and quantitative predictions of a heterogeneous firm model à la 
Melitz (2003) in the context of the Canada - US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) of 1989. 
We calibrate our model to the pre-trade liberalization stage, simulate the trade liberalization, 
and compute the resulting growth rates of Canadian industry productivity, exports and 
imports. We compare them with Trefler’s (2004) estimates of the effects of CUSFTA. Our 
results show that our model performs well in replicating the qualitative aspects of Trefler’s 
results. In particular, we correctly predict that US tariff cuts have smaller productivity 
enhancing effects than Canadian tariff reductions due to the entry of less efficient exporters. 
Quantitatively, the model tends to underpredict the impact of CUSFTA on growth rates of 
productivity, but overpredicts the increase in Canadian exports and imports. We discuss how 
liberalization-induced changes in the firm-level productivity distribution can reconcile the 
model with the evidence. 
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal contribution by Melitz (2003), heterogeneous rm models have become
a widely used instrument in the toolkit of international economists. These models
were motivated by a number of stylized facts: (i) the existence of large productivity
di¤erences among rms within the same industry; (ii) the higher productivity of exporting
rms as compared to non-exporting rms; (iii) the large levels of resource reallocations
across rms within exporting industries following trade liberalization reforms; and (iv)
the resulting gains in aggregate industry productivity. In a generalization of the Krugman
(1979, 1980) model, the introduction of within-industry productivity heterogeneity and
beachhead costs enables this class of models to produce equilibria and comparative statics
along the lines of these facts.
While these models are thus broadly consistent with available empirical evidence, a
thorough evaluation of their qualitative and quantitative predictions with regards to trade
liberalization is still outstanding. This is despite the fact that the modelspredictions on
the link between trade liberalization and changes in aggregate productivity or trade ows
are of rst-order importance for economic policy and welfare analysis. In this paper, we
attempt for the rst time to provide such an evaluation. We go beyond the stylized facts
listed above and ask to what extent heterogeneous rm models in the tradition of Melitz
(2003) are able to replicate both qualitative and quantitative ndings from a specic
trade liberalization.
We do so in the context of the Canada - US Free Trade Agreement of 1989 (henceforth,
CUSFTA). As has been argued elsewhere, CUSFTA is an ideal setting for the evaluation
of trade liberalization episodes (see Treer, (2004)). It was a puretrade liberalization
in the sense that it was not accompanied by any other important economic reform, nor
was it a response to a macroeconomic shock. It was also largely unanticipated since
its ratication by the Canadian parliament was considered highly unlikely as late as
November 1988.1 Finally, the main instrument of liberalization were tari¤ cuts which are
easily quantiable and as such ideally suited for an econometric analysis.
Not surprisingly then, CUSFTA has been extensively studied over the past decade
(e.g. Treer (2004); Head and Ries (1999) and (2001)). We take the results of these
studies as our starting point, in particular Treer (2004). Consistent with the stylized
facts outlined above, Treer nds that CUSFTA led to strong productivity increases in
Canadian manufacturing which to a large extent were due to a reallocation of market
shares towards high-productivity rms. He also uncovers some more subtle e¤ects. For
example, Canadian tari¤ cuts had a much stronger e¤ect on Canadian productivity gains
than US tari¤ reductions. The magnitudes of some of the e¤ects documented by Treer
1See Breinlich (2008) for a discussion of this point. Frizzell et al. (1989) provide a detailed account
of the political context in which the agreement was signed.
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are also astonishing - the third of Canadian manufacturing industries subject to the
highest domestic tari¤ cuts saw labor productivity increase by 15% over the eight years
following the implementation of CUSFTA.
The goal of our analysis is to evaluate the extent to which a version of Melitzs het-
erogeneous rm model can account for these facts, both qualitatively and quantitavely.
We begin by constructing a Melitz-style model which captures the main features of the
Canadian-US liberalization experience. In particular, we allow for asymmetries across
countries in terms of size, bilateral tari¤s and parameter values such as xed costs. We
then calibrate the models parameters to the pre-liberalization period, simulate the lib-
eralization using the actual tari¤ cuts, and confront the models predictions with regards
to industry productivity growth and trade ows with the empirical evidence provided by
Treer.
Our results indicate that the model performs well in replicating the qualitative fea-
tures of Treers results. Consistent with his empirical estimates, our model predicts an
asymmetric e¤ect of Canadian and US tari¤ reductions on aggregate Canadian produc-
tivity, with Canadian tari¤ cuts having the larger impact. Our model also captures the
broad qualitative patterns of the e¤ects of tari¤ reductions on Canada-US trade ows.
The results of a comparison of the quantitative predictions of our model with Treers
estimates are more mixed. In our baseline specication, we only predict around a quarter
of the estimated impact of liberalization on aggregate labor productivity. On the other
hand, we overestimate the increase in Canadian exports and imports by a factor of at
least two, and up to a factor of 30 in some simulations!
In a nal step, we look at ways to reconcile the theoretical predictions with the
data. We show that allowing for empirically plausible changes in within-rm productivity
signicantly improves the models performance. In conclusion, it thus seems that the
standard approach of abstracting from rm-level productivity gains is useful for modeling
qualitative patterns of trade liberalizations. However, to match quantitative patterns as
well, future work on heterogeneous rm models will have to take within-rm productivity
changes more seriously.
We are not the rst to calibrate models with heterogeneous rms. Eaton and Kortum
(2002) use international trade ows to calibrate a Ricardian model with perfect competi-
tion and perform various counterfactual policy experiments. Bernard et al. (2003) use a
modied version of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to explain di¤erences between US exporting
and non-exporting manufacturing rms and to analyse the e¤ects of several trade-related
policy changes. Irarrazábal and Opromolla (2005) also use the Eaton-Kortum model to
study Chiles liberalization experience of the 1970s and 1980s. Del Gatto et al. (2006)
calibrate the model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) on European data to evaluate the
benets of trade liberalization in the EU.
None of these contributions uses Melitzs original contribution as their modeling
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framework. In contrast to these papers, we are also not primarily interested in coun-
terfactual experiments. Rather, we see our calibration exercise as a way to test the
fundamental predictions of models of the class of Melitz (2003).2 The Canada-US Free
Trade Agreement together with Treers seminal study provide an optimal setting for
this endeavour. In particular, we are not obliged to compare our models predictions
to the raw moments of the data. Using Treers empirical techniques, we can instead
isolate the e¤ect of tari¤ cuts from the large number of confounding factors which also
inuenced productivity and trade over the period under study and which will never be
fully captured by a stylized model such as ours.
We also contribute to the literature by providing a tractable extension of Melitz (2003)
to an asymmetric multi-country setting. In this, our paper is related to recent contribu-
tions by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Chaney (2008). Finally, our paper also relates
to a number of papers which have used CUSFTA for testing trade theories. For example,
Head and Ries (1999) analyze the impact of tari¤ cuts on the number and scale of Cana-
dian rms in order to test competing models of imperfect competition. Head and Ries
(2001) use CUSFTA to evaluate Krugman and Armington style models of international
trade. Kehoe (2005), too, advocates the use of trade liberalization episodes (in his case,
NAFTA) as a way to assess the empirical validity of applied general equilibrium models.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we revisit Treers re-
sults and extend his methodology to additional variables of interest. Section 3 discusses
our extension of the Melitz model. Sections 4 and 5 evaluate the models qualitative
and quantitative predictions in the light of Treers results. In section 6 we discuss to
what extent liberalization-induced changes in the rm-level productivity distribution can
reconcile the model with the evidence. Section 7 concludes.
2 Revisiting Treers Results for Trade and Productivity
Treer (2004) tries to estimate the causal impact of CUSFTA-mandated reductions of
Canadian and US tari¤s on a set of Canadian variables such as labor productivity and
trade. His identication strategy thus needs to isolate these e¤ects from a large number
of confounding factors. He starts from a di¤erence-in-di¤erences specication in which he
regresses changes in the dependent variable (e.g. labor productivity growth) on changes
in US and Canadian tari¤s pre- and post-CUSFTA:
(yi1  yi0) = 0+CA
 
tCAi1  tCAi0

+US
 
tUSi1  tUSi0

+X (Xi1  Xi0)+"i;
2Two recent papers, Eaton et al. (2008) and Armenter and Koren (2009) also explore the quantitative
performance of Melitz (2003), but focus their attention on the models export features outside of the
context of trade liberalization.
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where yi1   yi0 is the annualized double log-di¤erence in the dependent variable of
interest in industry i. Likewise, tCAi1   tCAi0 and tUSi1   tUSi0 represent the double
di¤erence in Canadian and US tari¤s, and Xi1   Xi0 is the double log-di¤erence in
additional control variables.3
For our purposes, it is important to note that Treer controls for a large number of
factors which also inuence the dependent variable of interest and might bias the esti-
mated impact of tari¤ reductions. His approach is thus close in spirit to the comparative
static exercises which we will perform below. That is, Treer estimates the impact of
CUSFTA-mandated tari¤ changes on changes in labor productivity and trade, holding
all other factors constant. In our view, comparing our models results to Treers condi-
tional moments is better suited for an evaluation of our model than a comparison with
the raw moments of the data  in the sense that it does not place an unfairly heavy
burden on a relatively stylized theory.
In table 1, we rst replicate Treers key results on labor productivity and Canadian
imports. We estimate the specication above with data provided on Daniel Treers
website and compare the results to his baseline specications (row 1 in his tables 2
and 3). As seen in columns 1 and 2, we are able to replicate Treers results almost
exactly. For example, Canadian tari¤ cuts have a strongly signicant impact on domestic
labor productivity in Canada. A one-percentage point change in
 
tCAi1  tCAi0

led, on
average, to a 1.4% increase in the rate of annual labor productivity growth in 1988-1996.
US tari¤ cuts also raised labor productivity, although the estimated e¤ect is smaller and
statisticially insignicant.
Treer renes his results by calculating a weighted total e¤ect on the third of Canadian
industries facing the highest domestic tari¤ cuts (import-competing industries) and on
the third of industries which enjoyed the largest US tari¤ concessions (export-oriented
industries). He also computes the total weighted impact of CUSFTA through both US
and Canadian tari¤ cuts.4
Lines 5-7 of table 1 report the corresponding results. Canadian tari¤ reductions in the
most impacted, import-competing industries caused a total labor productivity increase of
0.15 log points or approximately 15% over the period 1988-1996. The e¤ect of US tari¤
concession on productivity in the most impacted, export-oriented industries was much
smaller at just 5%, and the total e¤ect of CUSFTA was a productivity increase of 6%.
3See Treer (2004) for details on these additional controls and further robustness checks. Most
importantly, Treer tries to control for industry-time varying trends and general business cycle e¤ects.
He addresses the rst issue by including changes in the dependent variable for the US economy as an
additional regressor. He also constructs a business cycle controlwhich is in essence an industry-specic
prediction of the e¤ect of business cycle conditions on the dependent variable. He also uses instrumental
variable methods but does not nd evidence for signicant endogeneity problems.
4In all three cases, Treer weighs industry-specic tari¤cuts using 1988 sectoral data on the numerator
of the dependent variable (i.e., value added for labor productivity and import and exports for the trade
regressions). He also converts annual changes into a total e¤ect for the period 1988-1996. See appendix
B of Treer (2004) for details.
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Column 2 shows the results from estimating the above equation using Canadian im-
ports from the US as the dependent variable. Again, Canadian tari¤ concessions had a
large positive impact, with imports rising by 45% in the most impacted, import-competing
industries and 14% overall. Surprisingly, US tari¤ concessions also had a positive impact
on Canadian imports, although the e¤ect is smaller and less statistically signicant.
In columns 3-4, we reproduce Treers ndings for the subset of industries which
we will use in our calibration. As discussed below, data availability and theoretical
considerations prevent us from using Treers full sample. However, columns 3-4 show
that Treers qualitative results are not a¤ected by the reduction in sample size. The
results for Canadian tari¤ cuts are almost exactly identical. The impact of US tari¤ cuts
is somewhat smaller than before, but the qualitative pattern is very similar to the one
arising from the full sample.
Finally, in column 5 we extend Treers methodology to Canadian exports to the US.
US tari¤ concessions had the expected positive e¤ect on Canadian exports although the
e¤ect is statistically insignicant. In contrast, Canadian tari¤ cuts reduced Canadian
exports but again the e¤ect is not signicant. We estimate that lower US tari¤s caused
an increase in Canadian exports by 16% in the most impacted, export-oriented indus-
tries. Canadian tari¤ cuts reduced exports by 18%, however, so that the overall e¤ect is
essentially zero.
To summarize, Canadian and US tari¤ concessions had strongly asymmetric e¤ects
on Canadian labor productivity. Labor productivity was strongly positively impacted
by Canadian tari¤ cuts, and to a lesser extent by US tari¤ reductions. Lower Canadian
import tari¤s led to higher Canadian imports while lower US tari¤s increased Canadian
exports. These ndings set the stage for the rest of this paper. We will investigate to
what extent our version of Melitz (2003) can replicate these ndings, both in terms of
the signs of the estimated e¤ects as well as their quantitative magnitude.
3 The Model
Our model is an extension of Melitz (2003) that is close to Helpman et al. (2004). We
allow for many industries and asymmetries across countries. Initially we simplify the
model by abstracting from its free-entry stage.5 However, further below we also model
the free-entry stage as in the original Melitz model.
5In this sense, our model is close to Chaney (2008).
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Demand
Consumers maximize the following two-tier utility function:
U =
X
i2I
i lnQi + A; (1)
Qi =
Z
2 i
qi()
i 1
i d
 i
i 1
; (2)
where  i represents the (endogenous) set of available varieties in the manufacturing sec-
tor i. i > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two goods in industry i.
Choosing good A as the numéraire, utility maximization on the upper level yields de-
mand functions A = Y  Pi i and Qi = i=Pi, where Y is total expenditure per con-
sumer. In the manufacturing goods sector, utility maximization yields demand function
qi() = pi ()
  P  1i i.
Technology and Environment
There are many countries, denoted by j. All countries produce positive amounts of the
numéraire good, which is freely traded; its industry operates under perfect competition
and with linear production function A = lA everywhere, where lA is labor employed in
the numéraire industry. This implies wj = 1 for all j.
Manufacturing goods are produced using labor as the only production factor. A
rmss output q and productivity  determine its variablelabor requirements q () =.6
In order to supply goods to its own domestic market, a rm must also pay a xed cost Fjj
in terms of the numéraire good. In order to export to country j0, country-j rms must
incur an additional xed cost Fjj0, also in terms of the numéraire good.7 International
trade is also subject to the standard iceberg transport cost  jj0  1. We assume that
domestic sales are subject to no transport costs:  jj = 1 for all j.
In each country, there is a given large mass Mj of potential entrants to an industry.
The productivity parameter  is revealed to rms before they pay the xed costs and
start production. In equilibrium, only those rms that can earn non-negative prots will
enter a market.
Firm-level Outcomes
Each manufacturing rm has monopoly power over the variety it produces. The pricing
rule of country-j rms is
pjj0() =

   1
 jj0

: (3)
6In what follows, industry and country notation is suppressed for simplicity wherever unnecessary.
7This ensures that only rms that also produce domestically will export, which is the empirically
relevant case.
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The rmsassociated demand levels (net of transport costs in the case of exports) are
qjj0() =


   1
 jj0

 
P  1j0 j0 : (4)
The rms resulting revenues (once again, in the case of export revenues they are expressed
net of transport costs) are
rjj0() =


   1
 jj0

1 
P  1j0 j0 : (5)
Prots are
jj0() =
rjj0()

  Fjj0 : (6)
Entry Thresholds
A rm with productivity  will enter the domestic market if jj()  0. Hence, jj(jj) =
0 denes the domestic entry cuto¤ jj:
8
jj =
"
Fjj

jP
 1
j (   1) 1
#1=( 1)
: (7)
Similarly, a rm will enter export market j0 in addition to producing domestically if
jj0()  0. Hence, the export cuto¤ jj0 is implicitly dened by jj0(jj0) = 0. Using
country-j rms export cuto¤ condition and country-j0 rms domestic market entry
condition, j0j0(j0j0) = 0, we can express country-js export cuto¤ as a function of
country-j0s entry cuto¤:
jj0 =

Fjj0
Fj0j0
1=( 1)
 jj0

j0j0 : (8)
The consumer price index is
Pj =
"X
j0
 Z 1

j0j
pj0j()
1 Mj0vj0()d
!# 1
1 
: (9)
8As in Melitz (2003), we assume parameter values such that the marginally protable rm will not
export: jj
 
jj

= 0() rjj
 
jj

= Fjj : For
jj0
 
jj

= 1 jj0
P 1j0 j0
P 1j j
rjj
 
jj


  Fjj0 < 0;
we need to impose  1jj0 Fjj0 >
P 1
j0 j0
P 1j j
Fjj . The price index Pj can be expressed as a function of the
models parameters.
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A common assumption in the heterogeneous rm literature is that  is Pareto distributed
(Chaney (2008); Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)).9 That is, v() = aka (a+1), with a; k > 0
and   k. Assuming the shape parameter a is equal for all countries, (7)-(9) yield
expressions for productivity cuto¤s jj and 

jj0 in terms of the models parameters,
which we can summarize as
jj0 =

Fj0j0
j0
a
a   + 1
1=a
 jj0

Fjj0
Fj0j0
 1
 1
24X
j00
Mj00k
a
j00
 a
j00j0

Fj00j0
Fj0j0
 1 a
 1
351=a : (10)
In the following, we assume that a > .10 The xed cost Fjj has a positive e¤ect on the
domestic entry threshold jj, as a higher Fjj makes it harder for domestic low-productivity
rms to break even. Fj0j and  j0j a¤ect jj negatively: the higher the cost to export into
the home market, the easier it is for country-js low-productivity rms to survive. Fj0j0
has a negative e¤ect on jj0: the higher this xed cost, the easier it is for country-js
rms to break even in country-j0s market. Higher costs to export into the foreign market
(Fjj0 and  jj0) raise the productivity threshold jj0 for country-js rms to break even
when exporting to country j0.
Industry Aggregates
Once we have expressed the entry cuto¤s as functions of the models parameters, it is
easy to do the same for all industry aggregates. We will prot from this information in
two ways. First, we will calibrate the models parameters by matching its moments to
the available data. Secondly, once we have calibrated the model, we will simulate the
tari¤ cuts implemented under CUSFTA and compare the resulting model predictions to
the empirical evidence discussed in section 2.
Mass of Firms
The mass of country-j rms active in market j0 is given by
Njj0 =

1  Vj
 
jj0

Mj =Mjk
a
j
 
jj0
 a
; (11)
where V () denotes the distribution function of . Our notational convention and our
assumption that all active rms operate in the domestic market implies Njj is the total
mass of country-j rms.
9See the evidence discussed in Luttmer (2002).
10For the nth-moment of a Pareto distribution to exist, we need a > n. We impose a >  to ensure
existence of the moments which are of interest for our purposes.
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Trade Flows
The f.o.b. value of exports from country j0 to country j is
Xj0j =
a
a   + 1Mj0k
a
j0Fjj

Fj0j
Fjj
 1 a
 1
 aj0j
 
jj
 a
: (12)
Sales
Aggregate sales by industry are
Rj =Mjk
a
j
a
a   + 1
"X
j0
 1 ajj0

Fjj0
Fj0j0
 1 a
 1
Fj0j0
 
j0j0
 a#
: (13)
Employment
Industry employment is
Lj =Mjk
a
j
a (   1)
a   + 1
"X
j0
 ajj0

Fjj0
Fj0j0
 1 a
 1
Fj0j0
 
j0j0
 a#
: (14)
Productivity
Following Melitz (2003),11 we dene an industrys aggregate productivity as
~j =
"X
j0
Njj0P
j0 Njj0
 
~jj0
 1# 1 1
; (15)
where
~jj0
 
jj0

=
"
1
1  Vj
 
jj0
 Z 1

jj0
() 1 vj () d
# 1
 1
=

a
a   + 1
 1
 1
jj0 : (16)
As further explained below, our calibration will not enable us to identify the level of ~j,
but only its growth rate - which is all we need to compare the models predictions to
Treers results.12
Alternatively, we will work with two more denitions of productivity. First, we simply
11In comparison with Melitz (2003), we do not adjust the productivity of exporters by the trade cost
 jj0 . This spares us some ambiguities in the derivation of the theoretical results in the next section.
Regarding our numerical results, discussed further below in the paper, this adjustment has negligible
relevance from both a quantitative and a qualitative point of view. The corresponding results are available
from the authors upon request.
12~j is a harmonic average. Notice that our assumptions on parameters imply 

jj0 > 

jj (see footnote
8), which in turn yields ~jj0 > ~jj .
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aggregate rmsoutputs linearly:
~Qj
Lj
=
1
Lj
264X
j0
1Z

jj0
 jj0qjj0Mjvj()d
375 = Mjkaj
Lj
a(   1)
a  
"X
j0
 1 ajj0

Fjj0
Fj0j0
 a
 1
Fj0j0
 
j0j0
1 a#
:
(17)
Again, we will work with the growth rate rather than the level of ~Qj=Lj.
Finally, we also use a measure which is most closely related to the way Treer measures
labor productivity in his paper. He uses the industry-level growth rate in deated value
added per hour worked to calculate labor productivity growth. We proxy for this with
the growth rate of (Rj=Lj) =p
 
~j

. We think of p
 
~j

as the average price charged
by country js producers (or, put di¤erently, the price charged by the producer with a
productivity level equal to the aggregate average, ~j). Notice that this average price
neglects the product variety component of ideal price indices based on CES functional
forms. This is similar to the calculation of the deators underlying Treers growth rates,
which do not account for changes in product variety.13
As we will see when presenting our simulation results below, the growth rate of
(Rj=Lj) =p
 
~j

is very similar to that of ~j. This suggests that deated sales per worker
is not a bad proxy after all for Melitzs aggregate productivity. The intuition for this
slightly surprising result is as follows. First, the ratio Rj=Lj does not move much with
changes in tari¤s. This is due to the CES assumptions of the model: rm-specic f.o.b.
sales r () are proportional to rm-specic employment l () which explains the almost
identical expressions we obtain for Rj and Lj (see equations (13) and (14)). This leaves
most of the actionin our third productivity measure to 1=p
 
~j

which in turn is closely
related to ~j (see the pricing equation (3)): an increase in average productivity reduces
the average producer price, thus raising the value of deated sales.
4 Model Evaluation - Qualitative Predictions
We now turn to an evaluation of the ability of our version of Melitz (2003) to replicate the
qualitative and quantitative features of Treers results from section 2. In this section, we
start by performing comparative statics exercises to check whether our model correctly
predicts the signs of the e¤ects of trade liberalization on aggregate productivity and trade
ows.
In line with our notation, we denote Canadian variables by subscript j and US vari-
ables by subscript j0 in the following propositions. In our model, we interpret a trade
liberalization as a reduction in the iceberg transport cost  . Since the main instrument
13We are grateful to Marc Melitz for pointing this out. See also Ghironi and Melitz (2005) for a
related discussion. Details on the construction of Statistics Canadas price deators can be found on at
http://www.statcan.gc.ca.
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of liberalization under CUSFTA were bilateral reductions in ad-valorem tari¤s, this the-
oretical interpretation ts well with the actual liberalization experience.
Proposition 1 Reductions of country-j import tari¤s (i.e. lower  j0j) raise country-j
aggregate productivity ~j.
Proof. First, from (10) and (11) it is easy to see that @Nj=@ j0j > 0, since @jj=@ j0j <
0. Intuitively, more domestic protection makes it easier for domestic low-productivity
rms to survive. Secondly, from (15), ~j is a weighted average of ~jj and ~jj0, with
~jj < ~jj0. More domestic protection reduces 

jj and thus ~jj; besides, Nj rises, raising
the weight of ~jj. (

jj0, ~jj0 and Njj0 remain constant.) Hence the average ~j falls with
more domestic protection: @~j=@ j0j < 0.
Proposition 2 Reductions of country-j0 import tari¤s (i.e. lower  jj0) have an ambigu-
ous e¤ect on country-j aggregate productivity ~j.
Proof. More foreign protection reduces the mass of domestic exporters Njj0: from
(10) and (11), @Njj0=@ jj0 < 0 since @jj0=@ jj0 > 0. This e¤ect has a negative impact
on ~j, as the weight on the larger component (~jj0) of average productivity falls. On the
other hand, average exporter productivity ~jj0 rises through the increase in 

jj0. (

jj, ~jj
and Nj remain constant.) Whether the overall e¤ect is positive or negative depends on
parameter values. Appendix A illustrates this issue by working out an example in which,
depending on the values of transport costs,
@~j
@jj0
can take positive or negative values.
Our model thus correctly predicts that reductions in Canadian import tari¤s raise
aggregate productivity in Canada. It also predicts that the same need not hold true for
reductions in US import tari¤s. Intuitively, lower foreign barriers mean that existing
exporters (which are the most productive rms) gain market share. However, there
is also export market entry by less productive rms which also expand output. The
overall e¤ect on aggregate productivity is thus ambiguous. This is again consistent with
Treers result of a positive but relatively small (compared to Canadian tari¤ concession)
and statistically insignicant impact of US tari¤ reductions. Interestingly, one of the
explanations advanced by Treer for this nding is that US tari¤ cuts encouraged export
market entry by less productive Canadian rms which partly o¤set the gains arising from
market share expansions of existing exporters. This is exactly what is underlying our
ambiguity result.
Proposition 3 Reductions of country-j import tari¤s raise country-j imports from coun-
try j0, but have no e¤ect on country-j exports to country j0.
Proof. From (12), we obtain that @Xj0j=@ j0j < 0 and @Xj0j=@ jj0 = 0.
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Thus, our model replicates Treers nding that reductions in Canadian tari¤s raise
imports from the US, and that US tari¤ concessions cause Canadian exports to the US
to increase. Recall from section 2 that Treer also nds that the impact of US tari¤
reductions on Canadian imports is smaller and less statistically signicant than the e¤ect
of Canadian tari¤ reductions.14 Similarly, the e¤ect of US tari¤ concessions on Canadian
exports is larger than that of Canadian reductions the latter is actually negative albeit
statistically insignicant. This is again consistent with our models prediction on the
relative importance of domestic and foreign tari¤ concessions on trade ows.15
5 Model Evaluation - Quantitative Predictions
The last section demonstrated that our version of Melitz (2003) is capable of replicating
the qualitative results of Treer (2004). We now raise the bar further by evaluating
whether our model can also replicate Treers ndings quantitatively. To this end, we
calibrate the models parameters on pre-liberalization data. We then simulate the fall
in tari¤ barriers implied by CUSFTA, holding all other parameters equal. For this, it is
useful to think of trade costs  jj0 as having a naturalcomponent, jj0, and a policy-
inducedcomponent, tjj0:  jj0 = 1 + jj0 + tjj0. We simply let tjj0 fall as observed in
CUSFTA, and compute the resulting changes in productivity and trade ows.
To simplify this exercise, and for reasons of data availability, we start with a two-
country version of our model, including Canada and the US only. Initially, we also
set jj0 = 0.16 In robustness checks reported below, we allow for a positive natural
component of trade costs and introduce a third country, the Rest of the World(RoW),
consisting of Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom.
We reduce the number of parameters to be calibrated in several ways. First, the
parametersMj and kaj (mass of potential entrants and the Pareto distribution parameters,
respectively) cannot be identied separately but only as their product, Kj  Mjkaj .
Moreover, Kj itself cancels out frequently from the expressions above. Still, we can
identify the ratios Kj=Kj, with which we can compute the growth rates of productivity
and bilateral trade ows.17
14This is particularly true for our smaller sample, see column 4 of table 1.
15The fact that we predict no e¤ect of domestic tari¤ concessions on domestic export is of course an
artifact of our abstraction from the relevant general equilibrium e¤ects. We thus regard the comparison
of relative e¤ects of domestic and foreign tari¤ concessions as more informative. However, in section 3 we
show that running Treers regressions on a dataset generated by our model actually does yield positive
e¤ects of US tari¤ cuts on Canadian imports. (This is because Treer imposes a particular functional
form in his regressions.)
16In a recent paper, Broda and Weinstein (2008) compare Canadian and US barcode data for the
period 2001-2003, and nd that the law of one price holds equally well for city pairs of the same country
and for city pairs with cities on di¤erent sides of the Canada-US border. Since we implicitly normalize
intranational trade costs to one, this result suggests that assuming no international trade costs in the
post-liberalization phase is not implausible a priori.
17This discussion obviously assumes that we can treat the mass of potential entrants as a constant
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Finally, we have direct proxies from the data for parameters tjj (ad-valorem tari¤s)
and j (industry-level expenditures). In the two-country model, we are thus left with 7
parameters which need to be estimated for each industry: the shape parameter of the
Pareto distribution a; the elasticity of substitution ; xed costs Fdd, Fff , Fdf , and Ffd;
and ratio Kf=Kd. (For the sake of clarity, when discussing parameter calibration issues,
we depart from our standard notation of countries j, and denote Canada, the US and
RoW with d, f , and w, respectively.)
Calibration Strategy
We proceed in two stages. First, we obtain estimates for a and  from rm- and industry-
level data. We then need to create a system of ve parameters and ve moments to
calibrate the remaining parameters. For this purpose, we use the following moments:
total number of rms (2), bilateral trade ows (2), and one Canadian concentration
ratio. We show in appendix B that the implied system of non-linear equations can be
solved for a unique set of positive parameter values. Thus, our model is able to match
the pre-liberalization empirical moments exactly.18
Parameters a and 
Total sales by exporting rms can be expressed as r () =
P
j0 rjj0() = 1
 1, which
is proportional to  1 (the term 1 is constant across rms). Since  is distributed
Pareto with shape parameter a, sales are distributed Pareto with shape parameter ar =
a= (   1) and cuto¤ kr = 1k 1. Thus, we can estimate ar and , and then recover a.
Obtaining ar from Sales Data Aggregate sales for rms with sales equal or larger
sales than rx are (assuming ar > 1):
Rrx =
Z 1
rx
rv(r)dr =
ark
ar
r
ar   1 (rx)
1 ar : (18)
Take the sales value rx that corresponds to the x-th largest rm. The fraction nrx of
rms that are bigger than or equal to this rm is nrx = 1 V (rx). Hence, rx = krn (1=ar)rx .
Taking the ratio to the y th largest rms sales eliminates kr: rxry =

nry
nrx
1=ar
. We do
not have data on rx, but we know the sales volume Rrx dened above (total shipments
parameter, which might be ne in the short run, but more controversial for the long run. We address
this issue below by modeling free-entry as in Melitz (2003): once again, we cannot identify Kj in the
post-trade liberalization steady state, but we can compute its steady-state change, which is all we need
to compute the long-run growth rates of our variables of interest.
18We focus on an exactly identied system in the initial calibration stage, since we are primarily
interested in evaluating the out-of-sample predictions of our model rather than the consistency of the
model with the pre-liberalization data. Using other moments for which we have data (such as additional
concentration ratios) does not alter the qualitative nature of the ndings below.
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times the concentration ratio):
Rrx
Rry
1=(1 ar)
=

nry
nrx
1=ar
: (19)
Solving for ar,
ar =
 
lnnry   lnnrx
 
lnRrx   lnRry

+
 
lnnry   lnnrx
 : (20)
If rm x is larger than rm y, we have nry > nrx and Rry > Rrx. Thus, ar > 1 from
above as long as
 
lnRrx   lnRry

+
 
lnnry   lnnrx

> 0, which holds by construction.
Obtaining of  from Firm-level Data Operating prots (that is, prots net of xed
costs) are
o () =
r()

: (21)
Since we have data on operating prots and revenue for US and Canadian rms, we can
obtain estimates of  from the above expression separately for each rm. Our industry-
specic estimate of  is simply the median across all rms within in an industry.
Data Description
For our calibration we require sector-level data on output, trade ows, tari¤s, the number
of rms and concentration ratios. We also need rm-level information on operating prots
and sales for the calibration of .
Most of our data on output, tari¤s and trade ows come from Treer (2004).19 For
the three-country version of our model, we complement these data with information on
sectoral-level output for Germany, Japan and the UK from UNIDOs Industrial Statistics
Database, and with information on US exports and imports from the NBER. We use gross
output in Canadian, US and RoW manufacturing industries as proxies for Rd, Rf , and
Rw (where w denotes RoW). As proxies for Xdf , Xfd, Xdw, Xwd, Xfw, and Xwf , we use
sector-level trade ows between the three countries. We also use these data to calculate
d, f and w as industry-level absorption, e.g. d = Rd + (Xfd +Xwd  Xdf  Xdw).20
Treer also provides data on Canadian and US import tari¤s which we use as proxies for
tfd and tdf .
We convert all data to the 4-digit level of the Canadian Standard Industrial Classica-
tion of 1980. Value data are expressed in 1992 Canadian dollars using the US-Canadian
Dollar exchange rate and 4-digit industry price and value added deators. To ensure
19These data are available on Daniel Treers website at http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/~dtreer/.
Treers original sources are special tabulations by Statistics Canada and the NBER Manufacturing
Productivity Database. See Treer (2004) for a detailed description.
20For the two-country version, this simplies to d = Rd + (Xfd  Xdf ) and f = Rf + (Xdf  Xfd).
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compatibility with our choice of numéraire, we further normalize all value data by Cana-
dian industry-level wages, proxied by total annual earnings per worker. Data on exchange
rates, deators and wages are also from Treer (2004).
Secondly, we use information from Statistics Canada, the US Census Bureau and
UNIDO on the number of enterprises as proxies for Ndd, Nff and Nww. Statistics Canada
also provides the output share accounted for by the top 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, and 50 enterprises
in each 4-digit Canadian industry. Multiplying these shares with total industry output
(Rd) we obtain the total output of the top 4, 8, etc. enterprises which we use as proxies
for Rrx.
Finally, the computation of  requires data on operating prots (o) and sales (r) at
the rm-level. We obtain these from Compustat North America and Compustat Global.
We proxy o as operating income before depreciation and r as net sales.21
Parameter Estimates
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the parameter estimates. We estimate a di¤erent
set of parameter values for each manufacturing industry in our sample. Availability of
concentration ratios and trade data reduces the number of industries from 213 in Treer
to 196 in our analysis. We furthermore drop 18 additional sectors which violate parameter
restrictions of our model, leaving us with 178 sectors in total.22
Our estimates of the elasticity of substitution  are of the same order of magnitude
as estimates at similar aggregation levels by Broda and Weinstein (2006a), (2006b). The
estimates of the shape parameter of the sectoral-level sales distribution ar are also com-
parable to other estimates in the literature: Chaney (2008), who measures ar as the
regression coe¢ cient of the log of the rank on the log of sales (across US listed rms),
reports estimates for ar of around 2. Eaton et al. (2008), with an alternative method
using the propensity of French rms to export to multiple markets, report estimates for
ar of around 1.5. This compares to a median value of 1.9 in our estimates.
For the rest of the parameters there are no easily comparable estimates from other
sources, but their median values seem mostly plausible. For example, recalling that we
normalized all value terms by Canadian sectoral wages, the estimates for Fdd and Fff
indicate that the median cost for Canadian and US manufacturing rms of entering their
domestic market was 339,000 and 509,000 Canadian dollars in 1988, respectively.
While our model thus produces broadly reasonable parameter estimates, the minimum
21Information on these variables is contained in Compustat North America data items 12 (net sales)
and 13 (operating income before depreciation). For Compustat Global, net sales are contained in data
item 1 and operating prots are calculated as operating income plus depreciation (data items 14 plus
11).
22We drop sectors for which our calibration yields a <  or jj > 

jj0 . We also experimented
with minimizing squared deviations between theoretical and empirical moments, subject to the second
constraint. Results were almost identical to the ones presented below.
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and maximum values reported in table 2 indicate that there are also a number of outliers.
In the robustness checks reported below, we experiment with excluding such sectors
insofar as they produce extreme growth rates for productivity or exports which could
drive our results.
Baseline Results
In this section we simulate the tari¤ cuts of CUSFTA (that is, a reduction in trade
cost parameters  df and  fd, holding all other parameters constant), and compare the
productivity gains and increases in trade ows predicted by the model with the estimates
reported in table 1, columns 3-5.
Recall that we dened trade costs as  jj0 = 1 + jj0 + tjj0, where jj0 are natural
trade costs and tjj0 are policy-induced barriers (tari¤s). For example, in 1988 the poultry
products industry (SIC 1012) had Canadian and US import tari¤s of 6.6% and 3.7%,
respectively. For our baseline results, we also assume that fd = df = 0. We thus
set  fd;t 1 = 1:066 and  df;t 1 = 1:037. Since CUSFTA was a free-trade agreement, we
simulate the trade liberalization by setting  df;t and  fd;t to one.
We compute the growth rates of productivity and trade ows discussed above for each
industry separately by using our calibrated parameter values, and  fd;t 1,  df;t 1,  df;t and
 fd;t. We rst do so separately for each of the tari¤s and then for both of them together.
These simulations correspond to the three comparative statics results implicit in Treers
regressions - the e¤ect of Canadian tari¤s (corresponding to CA), the e¤ect of US tari¤s
(corresponding to US), and their joint impact.
Thus, we obtain a set of three simulation results for each of our measures of produc-
tivity growth and for import and export growth. Table 3 presents the results of these
baseline simulations. For comparison with Treers results, we report weighted averages
of our sector-specic simulation results. Specically, we calculate a weighted average for
the most impacted, import-competing third of industries when performing the simula-
tion corresponding to a unilateral Canadian liberalization (reducing tfd to zero). When
simulating the reduction in tdf (unilateral US liberalization), we similarly use a weighted
average of results for the most impacted, export-oriented third of industries. Finally,
for the bilateral liberalization simulation (both tdf and tfd set to zero), we compute a
weighted average across all sectors.23
The rst line in table 3 is thus comparable to line 5 in table 1 (Impact on most
impacted, import competing industries). Depending on the productivity measure we use,
we predict around a quarter (3.2%-4.0%) of the 14% overall increase estimated earlier.
23Following Treer (2004), we use value added and trade ows by industry in 1988 to weigh our sector-
specic simulation results for trade and productivity increases.(compare footnote 4). That is, we calculateP
iI ~yi$i, where ~yi is the simulation forecast for sector i and $i the share of i in total exports, imports
or value added in the group of industries I (import- competing industries, export-oriented industries or
all industries).
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We do better on the predicted e¤ects of US tari¤ reductions (line 2). In column 3 of table
1, we estimated an increase of 2%, very close to the prediction for our second productivity
measure (Q=L). The other two productivity measures do essentially predict no e¤ects,
however, so that on average we underpredict the productivity impact of US tari¤ cuts as
well.
More importantly, however, our simulation results capture the key stylized fact about
the asymmetric e¤ect of tari¤ reductions on productivity. Canadian tari¤ reductions led
to a much bigger increase in aggregate productivity than US tari¤s. Again, the reason
why this happens in our simulation is that lower US import tari¤s encourage entry by
less e¢ cient exporting rms.24
As mentioned before, our model matches the broad qualitative pattern of predicted
changes in Canadian imports and exports from and to the US. The results in table 1
(column 4) show that Canadian imports in the most impacted, import-competing third
of industries increased by 46% in response to Canadian tari¤cuts, and by 17% in response
to US tari¤ cuts in the most impacted, export-oriented industries. We predict a positive
impact of Canadian tari¤ reductions and no e¤ect of US tari¤ reductions, so the ordering
of magnitudes is similar.
With regards to quantitative accuracy our model does less well. We predict an increase
of 380% for the response of Canadian imports with respect to domestic tari¤s which is
roughly eight times larger than the 46% estimated earlier. As said, our model predicts no
increase in response to US tari¤ reductions so we are again some way o¤ the 17% increase
estimated in section 2. In terms of the CUSFTAs total e¤ect our model again overpredicts
although not as badly as for the unilateral Canadian liberalization (we predict a 50%
increase versus a 12% increase in our replication of Treers results for our smaller sample).
Our model also overpredicts the increase in Canadian exports to the US in response to
trade liberalization (table 3, column 5). We predict a weighted average increase of 400%
in response to US tari¤ cuts and no increase in response to Canadian tari¤ cuts. The
corresponding estimation results from section 2 are 16% and -18%. We also overpredict
the overall e¤ect by an order of magnitude (+35% vs. no overall e¤ect).
To summarize, our simulation results again conrm that our version of Melitz (2003)
matches the qualitative ndings of Treers analysis quite well. Our model does somewhat
less well on the quantitative aspects. It systematically underestimates productivity gains
and overestimates increases in trade ows. In the following sections, we investigate how
robust these patterns are to variations in our simulation design.
24An additional reason is that US tari¤ cuts are on average only half as large as Canadian tari¤ cuts.
However, this does not explain the negative growth rates we obtain for a substantial fraction of industries
when we simulate a US unilateral trade liberalization (note that the weighted average impact for our
deated-sales measures is negative, too).
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Robustness Checks
Outliers
For some sectors, our model can only match the pre-liberalization moments with extreme
values for parameters (see table 2). This is a source of concern insofar as it might generate
outliers in predicted trade ow and productivity changes.
Table 4 thus presents results for the same simulations as in table 3, but excludes
sectors with either very low or very high growth rates for each of our ve variables of
interest. Variable by variable, we rst exclude the top and bottom 1% of sectors and
then the top and bottom 5%.
Removing outliers does indeed reduce the predicted increase in trade ows by up to
half, but this still leaves us considerably above Treers estimates. At the same time,
the predicted productivity increases drop as well, taking us even further away from the
results in table 1.
Regression-based Approach
Treer estimates the reported e¤ects of CUSFTA on trade and productivity assuming
a specic functional form for the impact of tari¤s reductions (his estimates are semi-
elasticities). In this section, we ask how his results would look like if we estimated a
specication motivated by Treers regression equation on our simulated data. Of course,
our model abstracts from both pre-CUSFTA trends in the data and other factors which
Treer tries to control for through di¤erencing and the inclusion of control variables. We
thus estimate a reduced version of Treers specication:
yi = ln yi1   ln yi0 = 0 + CAalt tCAi + USalttUSi ; (22)
where yi is the prediction of our model for growth rates of productivity and trade ows,
respectively, and tCAi = t
CA
i1   tCAi0 and tUSi = tUSi1   tUSi0 are the CUSFTA-mandated
tari¤ cuts which we used in our simulations.
Since Treers data were of course generated by a bilateral trade liberalization, we also
generate the data for the estimation of (22) by setting both US and Canadian tari¤s to
zero in our simulations. Once we have obtained estimates of CAalt and 
US
alt , we calculate the
same magnitudes reported in table 1, using the same approach as Treer (i.e., the impact
on the most-impacted, import-competing industries, the impact on the most-impacted,
export-oriented industries, and the total impact of CUSFTA).
As shown in table 5, using this alternative approach brings our results closer to Tre-
ers estimates along some dimensions but not along others. The e¤ect of Canadian
reductions on aggregate productivity is qualitatively comparable to our baseline, albeit
slighly weaker. On the other hand, we now do better on the predictions on trade ows.
18
We predict a 106% increase in Canadian exports in response to US tari¤ reductions and
a 137% increase in Canadian imports in response to Canadian tari¤ cuts (compared to
16% and 46% in our estimations reported in table 1, respectively). We also do quite well
in replicating US tari¤ cut-induced productivity gains, in particular for our productivity
measure Qd=Ld.
Long-run Results
So far we have abstracted from rm entry by holding xed the mass of potential entrants,
Md and Mf , during our simulation of CUSFTA. Our results up to now are thus best
thought of as a short-run response to trade liberalization. We think that this corresponds
best to Treers study, which covers a period of eight years after CUSFTA. However, since
any denition of short vs. long run is somewhat arbitrary, we also analyse the long-run
responses predicted by our model.
To do so, we rst extend our theoretical framework to include free entry and then
repeat the same simulations as above. Consider thus the following free-entry condition
for country j: 
1  V  jj jNjj = jFj; (23)
where j denotes country-j industrys aggregate prots; j is country js discount rate;
and Fj is the xed cost (in terms of the numéraire) that a rm has to pay to pick a draw
from the productivity distribution.25 Appendix C demonstrates how (23) can be used to
solve for long-run changes in the parametersKj and calculates the corresponding long-run
growth rates of trade and productivity. Table 6 presents the corresponding results.
The key change in the long run is that the mass of potential entrants, Mj, adjusts.26
Specically, a unilateral Canadian liberalization reduces Md as operating prots are re-
duced through the e¤ect of stronger import competition on the price level. At the same
time, lower Canadian tari¤s increaseMf as US exporters can now make additional prots
on the Canadian market. These changes lead to similar adjustments in the number of
exporters in each country, and explain why we now observe a stronger increase in US
exports than in the short-run, and a decrease in Canadian exports in response to lower
Canadian tari¤s. Exit by Canadian rms in the long-run also implies a lower cuto¤ on
the domestic market, and thus lower productivity gains.27
A unilateral US liberalization has the opposite e¤ects onMd andMf more Canadian
and less US entrants. Accordingly, the e¤ect on trade ows mirrors the one of Canadian
25This free-entry condition can be generated as in Melitz (2003), and is consistent with the rest of our
models setup. We omit a detailed discussion of the corresponding assumptions for the sake of brevity.
26More precisely, we only identify changes in Kj = Mjkaj . Assuming that k
a
j stays constant, changes
in Kj capture changes in the mass of entrants.
27Note that the average long-run e¤ect of a unilateral liberalization on the liberalizing countrys pro-
ductivity cuto¤ is positive in our simulations. This stands in contrast with the results in Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008), where the short-run increase in the cuto¤ is wiped out completely in the long run.
19
tari¤ reductions. For productivity, however, the observed increases are much stronger
than in the short run. The productivity-decreasing entry of less e¢ cient exporters still
takes place. But now this is accompanied by an increase in the domestic productivity
cuto¤ dd due to increased entry. This e¤ect is also the main driver of the additional
productivity gains of bilateral liberalization in the long run over and above its short-run
impact (now predicted to be between 1.4-3.3% rather than -0.2-2.1% as in the short run).
Despite these changes, however, the overall picture remains broadly the same. While
our long-run results yield higher productivity increases, they remain well below Treers
estimates in the case of unilateral Canadian tari¤ cuts. The predictions for exports and
imports are also still much higher than what Treer nds. We now do very well on the
results for productivity gains induced by a unilateral US liberalization, however. All
three productivity measures are close to the 2% increase we estimated in section 2 for
our smaller sample, and the average across measures is 2.1%.
Three Countries
We also extend our baseline model in two additional ways. First, we calibrate a three-
country version but still stick to our earlier assumption of no natural trade barriers. We
then allow for positive natural trade barriers calibrated on the pre-liberalization stage
of our model. These changes require a recalibration of our model to obtain values for
the various additional parameters. Appendix B describes this procedure in more detail.
Here, we focus on a discussion of our results.
Table 7 shows predictions for the three-country model without natural trade barri-
ers. The predicted productivity gains are now smaller than in our baseline simulations.
Intuitively, the existence of a third country with which Canada does not liberalize trade
implies that the change relative to the initial situation is less dramatic. On the other
hand, trade increases by more as standard trade diversion e¤ects compound the trade
creation e¤ect from the two-country model. That is, Canada and the US now obtain a
larger fraction of their overall imports from each other, rather than from the rest of the
world.
Allowing for multiple countries thus makes it more di¢ cult to reconcile our simulation
results with Treers ndings. This is also true when we allow for natural variable trade
barriers (table 8). Again, the predicted productivity increases are smaller than what
Treer estimated, while predicted trade growth is too high.
General Equilibrium
We conclude our robustness checks by discussing a number of general equilibrium issues
that we have ignored so far. The assumptions of quasi-linear preferences (which elim-
inate income e¤ects) and of a freely traded numéraire good (which xes the wage and
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enables us to ignore the balanced trade condition) shut down the possibility of general-
equilibrium e¤ects that might enhance the e¤ects of trade liberalization. In the original
Melitz model, for example, a symmetric trade liberalization leads to an increase in the
real wage, thus raising the industrys productivity cuto¤and reinforcing the e¤ect of tari¤
cuts on aggregate productivity.
Modeling these general equilibrium e¤ects is a challenging task, as the choices one has
to make are not obvious at all. At the same time, we have reasons to believe these e¤ects
might not be that strong after all. First, whether workers (or a large fraction of them) are
freely mobile across industries or sector specic is a key question. The former assumption
would lead to minor e¤ects, given the relative size of the manufacturing sector in Canada
and the US. The latter might lead to outcomes in di¤erent directions across industries,
given the asymmetry of CUSFTA. Secondly, the balanced trade condition does not hold
between Canada and the US. In fact, since CUSFTA is likely to have lead to di¤erent
aggregate gains in productivity for the two countries over time, the liberalization itself is
likely to have had an e¤ect on the trade balance. Once again, obviously, the size of the
manufacturing sector relative to GDP qualies the importance of this type of e¤ects.
Rather than focusing our attention on these macro issues, below we consider a
microissue that is likely to be much more relevant from a quantitative (and empirical)
point of view.
6 Reconciling Theory and Evidence
At this point, it is worth taking stock of our results so far. While our model did well
at replicating the qualitative aspects of Treers results, it was much less successful in
terms of its quantitative predictions. This is especially true for the two trade ows and
the productivity gains induced by Canadian tari¤ reductions. In contrast, we came quite
close to productivity gains induced by US tari¤ reductions in some of the robustness
checks (e.g., when allowing for long-run entry). In the following, we will thus mainly look
at ways of reconciling theory and evidence for the fomer three measures. However, the
solution we propose below also addresses remaining shortcomings in productivity gains
driven by US tari¤ cuts.
At rst sight, the fact that our model underpredicts productivity growth but overpre-
dicts trade growth suggests that the task of reconciling theory and evidence is not that
easy. This is because productivity and trade are closely linked. Intuitively, any change
to the model which increases aggregate productivity will also raise aggregate sales and
thus exports, improving the models performance on one dimension but making it worse
on another.
As we explain in the next section, however, the diverging behavior of our two variables
of interest has a common root. We rst outline this argument and then discuss ways to
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correct the models quantitative performance.
Understanding the Models Performance
For the following, it is helpful to write the models predictions in elasticity form.28 The
elasticity of ~j with respect to  j0j is
d~j
d j0j
 j0j
~j
=
NjjP
j0 Njj0
""
1 
 
~jj
 1 
~j
 1
#
a
   1 +
 
~jj
 1 
~j
 1
#
djj
d j0j
 j0j
jj
< 0; (24)
whereNjj=
P
j0 Njj0,
 
~jj
 1
=
 
~j
 1 2 (0; 1), and a= (   1) > 1. Given our parameter
estimates, the fraction of purely domestic rms to all Canadian rms (Njj=
P
j0 Njj0) and
the term in squared brackets in (24) are both close to unity. That is, the magnitude of
the productivity reaction depends mainly on the elasticity of the domestic cuto¤. Figure
1 visualizes this by plotting the absolute values of the two elasticities against each other
for all 178 sectors. From gure 1, it is also evident that the cuto¤ elasticity is small in
most industries (the median value is -0.12). As a result, average aggregate productivity
gains are small.
The elasticity of Canadian trade ows with respect to tari¤ reductions also depends
on the domestic cuto¤ elasticity:
dXj0j
d j0j
 j0j
Xj0j
=  a

1 +
djj
d j0j
 j0j
jj

< 0: (25)
This time, however, a higher cuto¤ elasticity implies a lower trade ow elasticity. In-
tuitively, a higher cuto¤ elasticity implies a stronger increase in aggregate productivitiy
(see (24)) which lowers the Canadian price index and makes exporting to Canada less
protable. (Vice versa, a stronger productivity reaction in the US will reduce Canadian
exports.)
The second determinant of the magnitude of the trade elasticity is the Pareto dis-
tributions shape parameter, a. Its role in determining the responsiveness of trade ows
to tari¤ cuts has already being discussed by Chaney (2008): the higher a, the more ho-
mogeneous the industry in terms of the distribution of rm productivities. In this case,
large productive rms represent a smaller fraction of rms. The export cuto¤ moves in
a region where most of the mass of rms lies. Therefore in those industries aggregate
exports are sensitive to changes in transport costs because many rms exit and enter
when the former vary.29
28Treers estimates are semi-elasticities but working with elasticities conveys the intutition underlying
our results more easily. None of the following conclusions hinges on this simplication.
29The attentive reader may wonder why our elasticity of exports with respect to transport costs does
not depend exclusively on the shape parameter a, as in Chaney (2008). This is due to the fact that we
are not making the simplifying assumptions Chaney makes. In earlier working paper versions, Chaney
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With our parameter estimates, this second e¤ect quantitatively dominates the o¤set-
ting e¤ect working through changes in the domestic cuto¤. Since the median value of a is
16 whereas the median value of the cuto¤ elasticity is only -0.12, it is not surprising that
we obtain very large increases in trade ows. Put di¤erently, the productivity enhancing
reallocation e¤ect in Canada is not strong enough to o¤set the direct e¤ect on US exports
working through lower Canadian tari¤s. Thus, the strong response of trade ows and the
small increase in productivity are in fact two sides of the same coin.30
Firm-level Productivity Growth
The fact that low productivity gains are also responsible for the overprediction of trade
ow increases suggests that a promising avenue for reconciling theory and evidence is to
look for additional sources of productivity gains.
One simple and empirically plausible way of doing so is to allow for within-rm pro-
ductivity gains. Indeed, Treer (2004) estimates that CUSFTA had a substantial impact
on rm-level productivity growth as well. That is, aggregate productivity increased not
only through a reallocation of market shares, but also because individual rms became
more productive. The most natural way to capture such changes in our model is to al-
low the parameters governing the productivity distributions of potential entrants (a, kd
and kf) to vary with trade liberalization. As it turns out, incorporating this simple and
empirically relevant change goes a long way in reconciling theory and evidence.
We proceed in two steps. We rst show that changes in the parameters governing the
productivity distribution of potential entrants can be chosen to exactly match aggregate
changes in productivity and trade. We then verify how reasonable our estimates are by
analyzing the implied changes in the productivity distribution of active rms - which is
observable.
In practice, it is easier to work with functions of a, kd and kf . Specically, we calibrate
changes in a, Kf=Kd and K
1=a
d to match changes in aggregate productivity and trade
ows.31 Technically, this is a system of three non-linear equations in three unknowns.
Appendix D shows that this system has a unique solution and that we can thus match
himself works out a more general case (Proposition 3) that yields an expression akin to (25).
30The reason why the domestic cuto¤ and price index move so little is the high ratio of exporting to
domestic xed costs (see table 2). This implies that the part of the domestic cuto¤ which varies with
import tari¤s obtains a very low weight (see (10)). This issue is reminiscent of the problem faced by
Armenter and Koren (2009, AK henceforth) in matching the share and size advantage of US exporters.
Similar to AK, our model predicts that exporters are very large and thus cannot be numerous if we want
to match aggregate trade ows, which in turn requires large exporting xed costs. An alternative to the
solution proposed below would thus be to weaken the link between producitivity, size and export status
similar to AK. The problem this approach faces in our context is that we do not have data on the share
and size of exporting rms by sector. It is also unclear how to interpret the additional heterogeneity in
the export decision of rms introduced by AK in terms of observable economic variables.
31Recall that Kj = Mjkaj . Assuming a constant Mj , changes in a, Kf=Kd and K
1=a
d are uniquely
determined by changes in a, kd and kf .
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aggregate trade and productivity growth rates exactly.
Table 9 reports the resulting parameter values for changes in a, Kf=Kd and K
1=a
d . As
results for our theory-based productivity measure (~j) are almost identical to the results
for our deated sales measure ((Rj=Lj) =p
 
~j

), we omit the latter for the sake of brevity
(results available from the authors upon request).
As we can see, K1=ad increased for the majority of industries, with a median increase
of 0.3-5.3%, depending on the type of liberalization and the productivity measure we try
to t. Since Kd =Mdkad , this is best interpreted as approximating the average increase in
the productivity cuto¤ of potential entrants (kd), keeping their mass (Md) xed.32 Not
surprisingly then, matching aggregate productivity gains requires potential entrants to
become more productive.
But what about trade ows? First recall that a higher kd also implies less imports
as domestic rms get more productive and the domestic price index declines. Secondly,
looking across the columns of table 9, we see that the change in a is also positive for
the majority of sectors. A higher a implies a larger mass of low-productivity potential
entrants. Since low-productivity rms are less likely to be exporters, this tends to decrease
exports from both Canada and the United States.33 Finally, the ratio of Kf=Kd increases
in the case of the unilateral US liberalization, and decreases for the unilateral Canadian
liberalization. A lowerKf=Kd can be interpreted as a stronger increase in the productivity
cuto¤ of potential entrants on the Canadian side than on the US side (and similarly, a
higher Kf=Kd implies a stronger increase on the US side). The e¤ect of these changes is
to further lower US exports (in the case of lower Kf=Kd) or Canadian exports (higher
Kf=Kd).
One way to read these results is to interpret them as residuals. That is, table 9 tells us
what changes in rm-level productivity are needed to match aggregate variables exactly.
However, we think that these parameter changes are also empirically plausible. In sup-
port, we provide two pieces of evidence based on the implied changes in the productivity
distribution of active rms - which is observable. First, we ask whether there is evidence
for the qualitative pattern of these changes. Second, we ask what rm-level productivity
gains our model predicts and compare them to Treers estimates.
We start by noting that the productivity distribution of active rms in country j is
given by:
fj()  vj()
1  Vj(jj)
=
akaj 
 (a+1)
kaj
 
jj
 a = a (a+1)  jja
32Note that changes in K1=ad = M
1=a
d kd capture increases in a as well, even with Md unchanged. In
unreported results, we show that a increased for the vast majority of sectors, as well as on average and
for the median sector (which is reported in table 9). Thus, in most cases the reported gure for K1=ad is
a lower bound for the increase in kd.
33Formally, exports will decline if kj <  jj0 (Fjj0=Fj0j0)
1=( 1), i.e. if trade costs are high relative to
the minimum level of productivity of potential entrants.
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That is, the productivity of active rms is also distributed Pareto, with shape parameter
a and cuto¤ jj. Further note that 

dd and 

ff can be written as:
dd = K
1=a
d

Fdd
d
a
a   + 1
1=a "
1 +
Kf
Kd
 afd

Ffd
Fdd
 1 a
 1
#1=a
(26)
ff = K
1=a
d

Fff
f
a
a   + 1
1=a "
Kf
Kd
+  adf

Fdf
Fff
 1 a
 1
#1=a
(27)
Changes in a, Kf=Kd and K
1=a
d thus directly map into changes in the shape parameter
and cuto¤ of the distribution of active Canadian and US rms. Specically, higher
values of K1=ad and Kf=Kd raise the cuto¤ which can be interpreted as a proportional
increase in productivity across all initial levels of . A higher a, in contrast, is consistent
with increases in the productivity of rms with initially low productivity, relative to
those with initially high productivity. From table 9, both e¤ects are present in all three
liberalization scenarios. This again claries how increases in rm-level productivity can
produce both higher aggregate productivity growth and lower growth in exports and
imports. Having more productive rms in both markets implies lower domestic price
indices and thus higher domestic cuto¤s, higher export cuto¤s and thus lower exports
from both countries. Together with the increase in the dispersion parameter a, this e¤ect
outweighs the increase in exports triggered by the higher productivity of the remaining
exporting rms.34
How realistic are these changes? There is of course a sizable empirical literature
predating Treer (2004) that documents within-rm productivity gains after trade liber-
alization (see Tybout (2003) for a survey). Direct evidence on changes in the shape of
the productivity distribution after trade liberalization is much rarer, however. A recent
paper which is supportive of an increase in the shape parameter a is Nocke and Yeaple
(2006). These authors report estimates that show a attening of the rm-level rank-size
distribution with lower trade costs.35 More generally, our ndings are consistent with a
more pronounced catch-up of low-productivity rms which manage to survive a liberal-
ization of import tari¤s. Since there is more scope for productivity enhancing measures
at such rms, this strikes us as a priori not implausible.
What about the magnitude of the shift in the productivity distribution of active
rms? Here we are on rmer ground as we can use Treers estimates of average within-
34In unreported results, we plotted changes in the rm productivity distribution resulting from chang-
ing the cuto¤s and the shape parameter separately. For the median sector, the rightward shift in the
distribution implied by changes in dd clearly dominated the overall change in the distribution, with
higher values of a only playing a minor role.
35With Pareto, the productivity  associated with rank  is  = kr
 1=a
 . Di¤erentiation shows that
@=@r < 0 and @2= (@r@a) > 0. Thus, given that sales are a monotonic function of productivity in our
model, a attening of the rank-size distribution is consistent with an increase in a:
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rm productivity growth to judge the reasonableness of our estimates. Theoretically, the
increase in the average productivity of active rms is given by:36
E
 
tjt > dd;t

E
 
t 1jt 1 > dd;t 1
 = at (at   1) 1 dd;t
at 1 (at 1   1) 1 dd;t 1
: (28)
Table 10 reports the implied average productivity increase among active rms for our
three liberalization scenarios and compares them to Treers estimates (shown in brackets
underneath the implied productivity gains).37 Depending on the productivity measure
we are trying to match, we are quite close to Treers estimates for all three liberalization
experiments (unilateral Canadian, unilateral US and bilateral liberalization). Of course,
there are still some discrepancies but these are an order of magnitude smaller than the
substantial deviations reported in the earlier sections of this paper.
7 Concluding Remarks
Models with heterogeneous rms à la Melitz (2003) have become a widely applied tool
in the International Trade literature. In this paper, we examined the qualitative and
quantitative predictions of a model of this class in the context of the Canada - US Free
Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) of 1989.
We began by constructing a Melitz-style model which captured the main features of
the Canadian-US liberalization experience (in particular, asymmetries in terms of country
size, bilateral tari¤s and parameter values such as xed costs). We then calibrated the
models parameters to the pre-liberalization period, simulated the liberalization using
the actual tari¤ cuts, and compared them with Treers (2004) estimates of the e¤ects of
CUSFTA.
Our results show that our model performs well in replicating the qualitative aspects
of Treers results. In particular, we correctly predict that US tari¤ cuts have smaller
productivity enhancing e¤ects than Canadian tari¤ reductions due to the entry of less
e¢ cient exporters. Quantitatively, the model does somewhat less well. It tends to un-
derpredict the impact of CUSFTA on growth rates of productivity, but overpredicts the
increase in Canadian exports and imports.
In a nal step, we allowed for changes in within-rm productivity as a way of rec-
36Treer estimates within-rm productivity gains for continuing establishments. There is no clear theo-
retical counterpart to this in our model, because we do not observe individual rms but only productivity
distributions.
37We adjust Treers estimates to take into account that the aggregate e¤ects are slightly di¤erent for
our smaller sample (see table 1). We do so by assuming that the contribution of within-rm productivity
gains to total gains remains constant as we move to our smaller sample. For example, Treer reports
an aggregate productivity e¤ect of Canadian tari¤ reductions on the most import-competing industries
of 0:15 and a within-rm e¤ect of 0:08 (lines 1 and 10 of his table 2, p.880). In our smaller sample, we
estimate an aggregate e¤ect of 0:14 and thus adjust the within-rm e¤ect to 0:08 (0:14=0:15) = 0:075.
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onciling theory and evidence. We showed that allowing for such changes allows us to
match aggregate productivity gains and trade ow changes exactly. We also provided
evidence that the required changes in the parameters governing the underlying rm-level
productivity distribution were empirically plausible.
In conclusion, it thus seems that the standard approach in the literature of abstract-
ing from rm-level productivity gains is useful for modeling the qualitative patterns of
trade liberalizations. To match quantitative patterns as well, however, within-rm im-
provements are needed. In this paper, we have outlined the broad pattern of changes
in the rm-level productivity distribution required to match conditional aggregate trade
and productivity moments. Directly incorporating these changes into heterogeneous rm
models, e.g. by allowing for endogenous reactions of the productivity parameters to
increased trade, seems a very promising venue for future research.
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A Comparative Statics - Productivity
This section shows that
@~j
@jj0
has got an ambiguous sign. Let us simplify by assuming two
countries and some symmetry: Fjj = Fj0j0 = Fjj0 = Fj0j, Kj = Kj0, and j = j0. Thus,
~j /
24 1 + 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can be positive or negative, depending on the values of a, ,  jj0 and  j0j. For example,
x a and , and consider di¤erent values of  : when both  jj0 and  j0j tend to one,
sign
n
@~j
@jj0
o
> 0; when both  jj0 and  j0j tend to innite, sign
n
@~j
@jj0
o
< 0.
B Calibration
Two-country Model
We demonstrate below that with given values for a and , our model can be solved for a
set of positive parameter values Fdd, Fff , Fdf=Fff , Ffd=Fdd and Kd=Kf . First, using the
models equilibrium outcomes for Ndd and Xfd, we can solve for Fdd as a function of a,
, and data:
Fdd =
 fdd  Xfd
 fdNdd
a   + 1
a
: (31)
By symmetry, from the models equilibrium outcomes for Nff and Xdf ,
Fff =
 dff  Xdf
 dfNff
a   + 1
a
: (32)
From the models equilibrium outcomes for Ndd and Nff and from (31) and (32),
Fdf
Fff
=
"
( fdd  Xfd)
 
 dff  Xdf

( fd)
a ( df )
aXfdXdf
#   1
 a 1 
Ffd
Fdd
 1
: (33)
From (gammadxstar2), (11), and (31),
Kd
Kf
=
 fdd  Xfd
( fd)
aXfd

Ffd
Fdd
 a 1
 1
: (34)
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Notice that Fdf=Fff and Kd=Kf are functions of Ffd=Fdd and known parameters/data.
Hence, all we need to do in order to complete our calibration is to solve for Ffd=Fdd.
Dene Tj > 

jj as the productivity level above which the productivity lies for the mass
NTj of most productive (and therefore largest) rms:
NTj =

1  Vj
 
Tj

Mj =Mjk
a
j
 
Tj
 a
: (35)
Hence, Tj =
 
NTj =Njj
 1=a
jj. Assuming 
T
j > 

jj0, the industrys revenue accounted
for by the top rms is
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: (36)
After some algebraic manipulations, we obtain RTd as:
RTd =
a
a   + 1

NTd
Ndd
  a 1
a
Ndd 

24Fdd +  2 df  1 fd Fff NddNff
 1 
a

 fdd  Xfd
Xfd
 1
a

Ffd
Fdd
2 2 a+a+1
( 1)a
35 : (37)
This is a non-linear equation in Ffd=Fdd with a unique positive solution. Once we ob-
tain Ffd=Fdd, we can nd values for Fdf=Fff and Kd=Kf from equations (33) and (34),
respectively.
Three-country Model - No Natural Trade Barriers
The three-country version of our model requires additional parameters to be calibrated.
Initially, we assume that jj0 = 0 and that  jj0 is thus a function of (known) tari¤s only.
We further make the simplifying assumption that export xed costs are destination-
specic only and do not vary by exporter. Thus, we now need values for a, , Fdd, Fff ,
Fww, Fdf = Fwf , Ffd = Fwd, Fdw = Ffw, Kf=Kd, and Kw=Kd. We calibrate a and  as in
the two-country model, leaving us with eight parameters. We use functions of the now
six bilateral trade ows and the number of rms in Canada, the US and the RoW for our
calibration.
Again, we can show that these moments can be exactly solved for a set of positive
parameter values. To see this, we start from the expressions for the number of active
30
rms and for bilateral trade ows to obtain,
Fdd =
d    1fdXfd    1wdXwd
Ndd
a   + 1
a
; (38)
Fff =
f    1df Xdf    1wfXwf
Nff
a   + 1
a
; (39)
Fww =
w    1dwXdw    1fwXfw
Nww
a   + 1
a
: (40)
Dividing Xdw by Xfw,
Xdw
Xfw
=
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Kf

 dw
 fw
1 a
: (41)
Hence,
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Xfw
Xdw

 dw
 fw
1 a
: (42)
Similarly,
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Kd
=
Xwf
Xdf

 df
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1 a
: (43)
Again from the expressions for bilateral trade ows, we can obtain
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Three-country Model - Natural Trade Barriers
Once we allow for natural trade costs, we require additional parameter values for the
jj0. To reduce the number of parameters, we make the simplifying assumption that
bilateral trade costs are symmetric, i.e. df = fd, dw = wd and fw = wf . This
choice still requires three additional moments as compared to the three-country model
without natural trade costs, yielding a total of eleven parameters in addition to a and .
As moments, we again use bilateral trade ows (6), the number of rms (3) as well as
two concentration ratios.
The implied system of non-linear equations cannot be solved explicitly this time.
Instead, we calibrate our parameters via the minimization of a quadratic form in the
deviations between moments and data. Formally, denote m the vector of data, m^ () the
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moments, and  the parameter vector (all vectors are 11 1). Thus,
 = argmin

(m  m^ ())0 I(11) (m  m^ ()) : (47)
where I(11) is the 11 11 identity matrix.
C The Long Run
We start by restating the free entry conditions (23) for each country:

1  V  jj jNjj = jFj; (48)
These conditions can be rewritten as
   1
a   + 1
"X
j0

Fjj0
Fj0j0
 1 a
 1
Fj0j0
 a
jj0
 
j0j0
 a#
= jFjk
 a
j : (49)
Notice that the right-hand side of this condition consists of parameters only, whereas the
terms on the left-hand side are functions of Kj. The left-hand side evaluated at the pre-
liberalization steady state and post-liberalization steady state must match. Assuming
that prior to the trade liberalization we had a steady state, we have a system of as many
equations as countries that can be expressed in terms of unknowns K 0j=Kj and K
0
j0=K
0
j,
where a prime distinguishes the new steady state from the old steady state. Notice we
can express the long-run growth rates of relevant variables (e.g., productivity) in terms
of K 0j=Kj, K
0
j0=K
0
j and the rest of calibrated parameters. For the two-country version we
obtain
~0d;t
~d;t 1
=

K 0d
Kd
1=a h N 0dd;t
N 0dd;t+N
0
df;t
[dd (K
0
d; t)]
 1 +
N 0df;t
N 0dd;t+N
0
df;t
[df (K
0
d; t)]
 1
i 1
 1
h
Ndd;t 1
Ndd;t 1+Ndf;t 1
[dd (Kd; t  1)] 1 + Ndf;t 1Ndd;t 1+Ndf;t 1 [df (Kd; t  1)]
 1
i 1
 1
(50)
for our theory-based productivity measure, where
dd (Kd)  dd=K1=ad =

Fdd
d
a
a   + 1
1=a "
1 +
Kf
Kd
 afd

Ffd
Fdd
 a 1
 1
#1=a
; (51)
ff (Kd)  ff=K1=ad =

Fff
f
a
a   + 1
1=a "
Kf
Kd
+  adf

Fdf
Fff
 a 1
 1
#1=a
: (52)
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For our empirical measure, Qd=Ld, we have:
d (Qd=Ld)LR =
~Q0d;t=Ld;t
~Qd;t 1=Ld;t 1
(53)
where
~Q0d;t
~Qd;t 1
=

K 0d
Kd
1=a Fdd [dd (K 0d; t)]1 a +  FdfFff  a 1 Fff [ff(K0d;t)]1 aa 1df;t
Fdd [dd (Kd; t  1)]1 a +

Fdf
Fff
 a
 1
Fff
[ff (Kd;t 1)]1 a
a 1df;t 1
; (54)
and
L0d;t
Ld;t 1
=
Fdd [dd (K
0
d; t)]
 a +

Fdf
Fff
 a 1
 1
Fff
[ff(K0d;t)]
 a
adf;t
Fdd [dd (Kd; t  1)] a +

Fdf
Fff
 a 1
 1
Fff
[ff (Kd;t 1)] a
adf;t 1
: (55)
Finally, the long-run changes in trade ows are:
X 0df;t
Xdf;t 1
=
264  1 adf;t f

Fdf
Fff
 a 1
 1
K0f
K0d
+  adf;t

Fdf
Fff
 a 1
 1
375
264 KfKd +  adf;t 1

Fdf
Fff
 a 1
 1
 1 adf;t 1f

Fdf
Fff
 a 1
 1
375 ; (56)
and
X 0fd;t
Xfd;t 1
=
2664  1 afd;td

Ffd
Fdd
 a 1
 1
K0d
K0f
+  afd;t

Ffd
Fdd
 a 1
 1
3775
264 KdKf +  afd;t 1

Ffd
Fdd
 a 1
 1
 1 afd;t 1d

Ffd
Fdd
 a 1
 1
375 : (57)
D Matching Productivity and Trade Growth
In this appendix we show that we can choose changes in the parameters a, Kf=Kd and
K
1=a
d to exactly match the growth rates of aggregate productivity and exports and im-
ports. First note that it is notationally less cumbersome to match the predicted post-
liberalization values of trade ows which are implicitly dened by the growth rates es-
timated by Treer. Thus, dene X^jj0;t = Xjj0;t 1  dX^jj0, where dX^jj0 is the predicted
sectorial level growth rates of exports or imports. Denoting all post-liberalization vari-
ables by subscript t, we can then solve for Kft=Kdt as a function of X^df;t and at (see
expression (12)):
Kf;t
Kd;t
=
f   X^df;t
X^df;t
at
df;t

Fdf
Fff
  1 at
 1
: (58)
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Next, using Kft=Kdt in the expression for X^fd;t, we can solve for at as
at =
(   1)
h
ln (d  Xfd;t) + ln f Xdf;tXfd;tXdf;t + ln

Fdf
Fff
Ffd
Fdd
i
(   1) ln ( df;t fd;t) + ln

Fdf
Fff
Ffd
Fdd
 : (59)
Lastly, we need to match productivity growth. Recall that we focused on two alternative
measures only in this section (~j;t and Qj=Lj). Solving the growth rate ~d;t=~d;t 1 for
K
  1
at
d;t K
1
at 1
d;t 1, we obtain:
K
  1
at
d;t K
1
at 1
d;t 1 =

at
at +1

(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 1 at+(df;t)
 1 at
(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 at+(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 at
1=( 1)

at 1
at 1 +1

(dd;t 1)
 1 at 1+(df;t 1)
 1 at 1
(dd;t 1)
 at 1+(df;t 1)
 at 1
1=( 1)  d^dt  1 ; (60)
where d^dt is the growth rate in sectorial productivity estimated by Treer. Using Qj=Lj
instead, we obtain:
K
  1
at
d;t K
1
at 1
d;t 1 =
at 
at +1
at 1 
at 1 +1
24Fdd[dd;t]1 at+1 atdf;t  FdfFff
 at
 1
Fff [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1 at
35
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 at+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 at
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1 at 1df;t 1  FdfFff
 at 1
 1
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35
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Fdf
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 at 1 1
 1
Fff [df;t 1]
 at 1
 
d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 1
;
(61)
where again, d^dt is the growth rate in sectorial productivity derived from Treers es-
timates. Together with the pre-liberalization estimates for a and Kf=Kd, the above
estimates can be used to calculate the growth rates in a, Kf=Kd and K
1=a
d;t reported in
section 6. Note that the number of observations decreases from 178 to 175 in tables 9
and 10. This arises from changes in a which lead to violations of the condition a > 
needed for the existence of all relevant moments.
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Table 1: Trefler’s Results 
 
 Trefler’s Sample Our sample 
Tariff cuts 
(1) Labour 
Productivity 
(2) 
Canadian 
imports 
from the 
U.S. 
(3) Labour 
Productivity
(4) 
Canadian 
imports 
from the 
U.S. 
(5) 
Canadian 
exports to 
the U.S. 
Canadian tariffs -1.420 -5.365 -1.593 -5.412 2.106 
 (-3.11) (-4.67) (-3.12) (-4.36) (1.26) 
U.S. tariffs -1.113 -5.289 -0.522 -3.431 -3.518 
 (-1.14) (-2.16) (-1.51) (-1.39) (-1.07) 
Business conditions 0.253 0.216 0.248 0.258 0.137 
 (8.30) (5.10) (7.58) (5.83) (2.73) 
U.S. control 0.159  0.131   
 (1.99)  (1.37)   
Impact on most 
impacted, import 
competing 
industries 
0.15 0.45 0.14 0.46 -0.18 
Impact on most 
impacted, export-
oriented industries 
0.05 0.25 0.02 0.17 0.16 
Total impact of 
CUSFTA (t-stat) 
0.06 
(3.84) 
0.14 
(6.10) 
0.06 
(3.29) 
0.12 
(5.18) 
0.00 
(0.26) 
Adj. R-squared 0.31 0.24 0.30 0.28 0.03 
Observations 211 210 178 178 178 
Notes: Table displays coefficient estimates and t-statistics for OLS regressions based on specification 
(1). ‘Impact on most impacted, import competing industries’ is the weighted average impact on the 
1/3 of Canadian industries exposed to the highest Canadian import tariff cuts (expressed in log 
points). ‘Impact on most impacted, export-oriented industries’ is the weighted average impact on the 
1/3 of Canadian industries exposed to the highest US import tariff cuts. ‘Total impact’ is the 
combined average impact on all Candian industries of both U.S. and Canadian tariff cuts. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Calibrated parameter values 
 
Parameter Observations Median Min Max 
σ 178 9.01 5.16 17.41 
a 178 15.98 6.31 45.21 
ar 178 1.94 1.13 4.88 
Fdd 178 11.34 1.43 590.70 
Fff 178 15.98 0.46 3269.36 
Ffd/Fdd  178 19.58 0.04 7.14E+18 
Fdf/Fff 178 7.60 0.05 135794.50 
Kd/ Kf 178 0.14 0.00 28384.08 
 
Table 3: Baseline simulation results 
 
Simulation (1) 
Productivity 
Measure 1 — 
Melitz 
(2) 
Productivity 
Measure 2 — 
Qd/Ld 
(3) 
Productivity 
Measure 3 — 
Deflated 
Sales 
(4) 
Canadian 
imports 
from the 
US 
(5) 
Canadian 
exports 
to the 
US 
Unilateral Canadian 
Liberalization (τfd=1), 
weighted average effect 
on most impacted, 
import-competing 
industries 
3.2% 3.9% 4.0% 379.7% 0.0% 
Unilateral US 
Liberalization (τdf=1), 
weighted average effect 
on most impacted, 
export-oriented industries 
0.3% 2.1% -0.2% 0.0% 400.8% 
Bilateral Liberalization 
(τfd=τdf=1), weighted 
average effect across all 
industries 
1.4% 2.3% 1.1% 50.4% 35.0% 
Number of industries 178 178 178 178 178 
Notes: Table presents simulation results for productivity and trade volume changes after the 
parameter changes indicated in the first column. We report weighted averages for the most impacted, 
import competing third of industries (row 1), the most impacted, export oriented third of industries 
(row 2), and for all industries (row 3). For productivity, we use the share of value added of an 
industry in 1988 in the total value added of the respective groups of industries as weights. For trade 
flows, we use the share of exports or imports of an industry in 1988 in the total value added of the 
respective groups of industries as weights. 
 
 
Table 4: Baseline simulation results, outliers removed 
 
Simulation 
Excluded 
sectors 
(1) Prod. 
— Melitz 
(2) Prod. 
— Qd/Ld 
(3) Prod.  
Deflated 
sales 
(4) 
Canadian 
imports 
from the 
US 
(5) 
Canadian 
exports 
to the US
Top and 
bottom 1% 3.0% 3.7% 3.7% 370.5% 0.0% 
Unilateral Canadian 
Liberalization 
(τfd=1), weighted 
average effect on 
most impacted, 
import-competing 
industries 
Top and 
bottom 5% 
2.3% 2.8% 2.6% 295.1% 0.0% 
Top and 
bottom 1% 0.3% 2.0% -0.1% 0.0% 350.6% 
Unilateral US 
Liberalization 
(τdf=1), weighted 
average effect on 
most impacted, 
export-oriented 
industries 
Top and 
bottom 5% 
0.3% 1.6% -0.1% 0.0% 181.7% 
Top and 
bottom 1% 1.4% 2.3% 1.1% 49.9% 31.9% 
Bilateral 
Liberalization 
(τfd=τdf=1), weighted 
average effect across 
all industries 
Top and 
bottom 5% 
1.2% 2.1% 1.0% 45.3% 21.3% 
Notes: Table presents simulation results for productivity and trade volume changes after the 
parameter changes indicated in the first column and the removal of outliers. For each of the five 
measures reported along the first line of the table, we remove the top and bottom 1% or 5% of sectors 
with the highest and lowest growth rates. See table 3 and text for details. 
 
Table 5: Simulation results, regression-based approach 
Simulation (1) 
Productivity 
Measure 1 — 
Melitz 
(2) 
Productivity 
Measure 2 — 
Qd/Ld 
(3) 
Productivity 
Measure 3 — 
Deflated 
Sales 
(4) 
Canadian 
imports 
from the 
US 
(5) 
Canadian 
exports 
to the 
US 
Unilateral Canadian 
Liberalization (τfd=1), 
weighted average effect 
on most impacted, 
import-competing 
industries 
2.4% 3.2% 2.3% 137.1% 64.0% 
Unilateral US 
Liberalization (τdf=1), 
weighted average effect 
on most impacted, 
export-oriented industries 
1.0% 1.9% 0.6% 55.7% 105.5% 
Bilateral Liberalization 
(τfd=τdf=1), weighted 
average effect across all 
industries 
1.2% 1.7% 1.0% 31.8% 19.1% 
Number of industries 178 178 178 178 178 
Notes: Table presents simulation results for changes in productivity and trade flows after the 
parameter changes indicated in the first column. See table 3 and text for details. 
 
Table 6: Simulation results, long-run 
 
Simulation (1) 
Productivity 
Measure 1 — 
Melitz 
(2) 
Productivity 
Measure 2 — 
Qd/Ld 
(3) 
Productivity 
Measure 3 — 
Deflated 
Sales 
(4) 
Canadian 
imports 
from the 
US 
(5) 
Canadian 
exports 
to the 
US 
Unilateral Canadian 
Liberalization (τfd=1), 
weighted average effect 
on most impacted, 
import-competing 
industries 
3.1% 3.8% 3.7% 405.3% -10.9% 
Unilateral US 
Liberalization (τdf=1), 
weighted average effect 
on most impacted, 
export-oriented industries 
1.4% 3.3% 1.6% -19.6% 505.1% 
Bilateral Liberalization 
(τfd=τdf=1), weighted 
average effect across all 
industries 
4.2% 2.8% 4.3% 41.9% 48.8% 
Number of industries 178 178 178 178 178 
Notes: Table presents long-run simulation results for productivity and trade volume changes after the 
parameter changes indicated in the first column. See table 3 and text for details. 
 
Table 7: Simulation results, three countries, no natural trade costs 
 
Simulation (1) 
Productivity 
Measure 1 — 
Melitz 
(2) 
Productivity 
Measure 2 — 
Qd/Ld 
(3) 
Productivity 
Measure 3 — 
Deflated 
Sales 
(4) 
Canadian 
imports 
from the 
US 
(5) 
Canadian 
exports 
to the 
US 
Unilateral Canadian 
Liberalization (τfd=1), 
weighted average effect 
on most impacted, 
import-competing 
industries 
3.0% 3.6% 3.9% 409.1% 0.0% 
Unilateral US 
Liberalization (τdf=1), 
weighted average effect 
on most impacted, 
export-oriented industries 
-0.2% 0.9% -0.7% 0.0% 402.7% 
Bilateral Liberalization 
(τfd=τdf=1), weighted 
average effect across all 
industries 
0.9% 1.7% 0.6% 54.6% 35.2% 
Number of industries 178 178 178 178 178 
Notes: Table presents simulation results for productivity and trade volume changes after the 
parameter changes indicated in the first row. See table 3 and text for details. 
 
Table 8: Simulation results, three countries, natural trade costs 
 
Simulation (1) 
Productivity 
Measure 1 — 
Melitz 
(2) 
Productivity 
Measure 2 — 
Qd/Ld 
(3) 
Productivity 
Measure 3 — 
Deflated 
Sales 
(4) 
Canadian 
imports 
from the 
US 
(5) 
Canadian 
exports 
to the 
US 
Unilateral Canadian 
Liberalization (tfd=1), 
weighted average effect 
on most impacted, 
import-competing 
industries 
1.6% 1.9% 2.2% 467.6% 0.0% 
Unilateral US 
Liberalization (tdf=1), 
weighted average effect 
on most impacted, 
export-oriented industries 
-0.1% 0.6% 0.3% 0.0% 305.3% 
Bilateral Liberalization 
(tfd=tdf=1), weighted 
average effect across all 
industries 
0.6% 1.0% 0.9% 56.3% 27.4% 
Number of industries 178 178 178 178 178 
Notes: Table presents simulation results for productivity and trade volume changes after the 
parameter changes indicated in the first row. See table 3 and text for details. 
Table 9: Parameter changes needed to exactly match aggregate trade and 
productivity increases (median values across industries) 
 
Simulation Unilateral 
Canadian 
Liberalization 
(τfd=1) 
Unilateral US 
Liberalization 
(τdf=1) 
Bilateral 
Liberalization 
(τfd=τdf=1) 
Change in Kd1/a - prod. 
measure 1 (Melitz) 
3.5% 1.2% 5.3% 
Change in Kd1/a -prod. 
measure 2 (Qd/Ld) 
0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 
Change in a 6.8% 1.4% 8.7% 
Change in Kf/ Kd  -24.1% 25.6% -1.3% 
Number of industries 175 175 175 
Notes: The table shows changes in parameter combinations governing the distribution of potential entrants. We 
show the changes needed to match aggregate changes in productivity and trade flows following the liberalization 
experiments indicated in the first row. See text for details. 
 
 
 
Table 10: Implied average productivity gains at the firm-level 
 
 Moments matched 
Simulation Prod. measure 1 
(Melitz) and trade flows 
 
Prod. Measure 2 
(Qd/Ld) and trade 
flows 
Unilateral Canadian Liberalization 
(τfd=1), weighted average effect on most 
impacted, import-competing industries 
13.4% 
(7.5%) 
9.0% 
(7.5%) 
Unilateral US Liberalization (τdf=1), 
weighted average effect on most 
impacted, export-oriented industries 
5.2% 
(5.6%) 
3.7% 
(5.6%) 
Bilateral Liberalization (τfd=τdf=1), 
weighted average effect across all 
industries 
6.3% 
(7.4%) 
4.3% 
(7.4%) 
Weights Trefler Trefler 
Number of industries 175 175 
Notes: The table shows the changes in average within-firm productivity implied by the parameter changes from 
table 9. For comparison, we report estimates based on Trefler (2004) in brackets underneath each change. See 
text for details. 
Figure 1: Elasticity of Productivity and the Domestic Cutoff with respect to 
Canadian Import Tariffs 
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Notes: Figure shows the plot of the absolute values of the elasticity of aggregate Canadian productivity (measure 1 – 
Melitz) with respect to the Canadian import tariff against the absolute values of the elasticity of the domestic Canadian 
cutoff with respect to the same tariff. Each dot in the graph represents one of the 178 sectors of our analysis. 
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